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We analyze in a simple two-period model the e¤ect of relative consump-
tion on saving by assuming that people care about their ordinal rank in the
consumption distribution at each date We outline some general properties
of the model and then completely solve a simple version. We show that a
rise in consumption inequalities implies a negative impact on saving.
JEL Classi…cation N.: D31, D62, E21.
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1. Introduction
Social status is a ranking of individuals based on their traits, assets, and actions
(see Weiss and Fershtman (1998)). Among other purposes, it provides a way to
allocate non-market goods such as authority or deference. Attempts of individuals
to achieve a greater social status may have profound implications on consumption
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Consumption may signal human and physical wealth and may inform about the
social position of the person which enjoys it. Consumption may also be a direct
source of social rewards insofar as a relatively high standing involves admiration
or envy by others. These various motivations imply that individuals are concerned
by their ranking in the consumers’ hierarchy.
Several empirical papers in the consumption literature have argued that some
form of comparison utility may play an important role in determining consump-
tion. Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (1997) examine the evolution of happiness
in the form of responses to survey questions in 13 industrialized countries since
the early 70s. They …nd no trend in the US, a decline in Italy and Germany for
example. Conventional models with absolute utility fail to explain these trends
since meanwhile, real incomes have more than tripled over the period. Solnick and
Hemenway (1998) use survey data to provide some empirical information about
concerns regarding relative standing. Half of the respondents preferred to have
50% less real income but high relative income. Kapteyn, Van de Geers and Van
de Stadt (1985) estimate a model in which both one’s own past consumption and
the consumption of others in‡uence utility. They cannot reject the proposition
that utility is entirely relative (see also a more recent paper by Kapteyn et al.
(1997)).
A concern for relative consumption may have signi…cant e¤ects on saving. In
this line of thought some economists have argued that it was partly responsible
for the decline in household savings and in growth observed in some developed
countries (for instance Knell (1999)). From a theoretical point of view, we need an
intertemporal model in which agents compare with each other their consumption
level. In this paper we analyze in a simple two-period model the e¤ect of relative
consumption on saving by assuming that people care at each date about their
ordinal rank in the consumption distribution. Saving is a¤ected by the dynamic
of the consumption distribution in a non-trivial way. We show by solving a simple
version of the model that a rise in consumption inequalities implies a negative
impact on saving.
The link between saving and status seeking has been studied by a number
of papers. Here we report only some that share similarities with the present
model. Corneo and Jeanne (1997) consider a model in which individuals derive
utility from their rank in the distribution of wealth. They show that the growth
rate of the economy increases with the initial equality of the wealth distribution.
Our model essentially departs from theirs by assuming that a higher consumption
2rather than a higher wealth confers a greater status. This di¤erence is motivated
by the fact that consumption is easier to exhibit than wealth, a well-known point
noted …rst by Veblen (1922). We show very di¤erent implications on saving.
Unlike their model the initial level of wealth inequality does not play a major
role. Rather, results crucially depends on the type of preferences postulated which
determines how a given level of wealth inequality translates into the dynamics of
consumption inequalities. Corneo and Jeanne (1999) propose a second model in
which the link between wealth inequalities and savingis more ambiguous. However
the same remarks regarding the di¤erences with the present model apply here.
Knell (1999) analyzes in an overlapping generation model the e¤ect of relative
consumption on saving. There are only two classes of wealth contrary to our
model in which a continuum exists. He shows that a concern for relative standing
produces a negative link between wealth inequality and growth if two conditions
are ful…lled: individuals have a higher concern for their present than for their
future relative standing and they refer to people that are wealthier than they
are. The …rst condition is reminiscent of the papers by Franck (1985) or Corneo
and Jeanne (1998). In particular Franck (1985) assumes that individuals care
about their relative rank in the consumption distribution. In its model saving is
depressed because only …rst period status matters. This very simple mechanism
is not reproduced in our model. Indeed, contrary to these three papers we assume
that people equally care about today’s and tomorrow’s status. Yet an impact of
inequalities on saving still remains.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we describe the model and derive
the equilibrium conditions. Section 3 analyzes the impact of relative consumption
on saving. The model is then fully solved in a simple case (section 4). Section 5
concludes the paper.
2. The model
We consider a single-good economy with two dates: t = 0;1 and a size-one contin-
uum of agents. Agents di¤er in their …rst period endowment denoted by yi
0 ¸ 0.
Their second period endowment is zero but they can transfer goods from the …rst
period to the second by means of a linear production function which produces R
for each unit invested at date 0.








according to the distribution
function F(:) Let f(:) denote the corresponding density function. We assume that
3f(:) has the following properties1:
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and let Gt(:) and gt(:) denote respectively the distribution function and
the density function of consumptions at date t. Gt(c) is the fraction of the pop-
ulation which consume less than c at date t = 0;1. We assume that people
derives utility from social status which is represented by their rank Gt(c) in the
consumers’ hierarchy. All individuals have identical preferences which depend on
consumption and on status:
H2 Let Tt(ci
t;) : [0;1[ ! R denote the reduced form of the instantaneous








where u(:) is an increasing, concave and twice continuously di¤erentiable func-
tion.
The coe¢cient ® re‡ects the strength of the status-seeking motive. We assume
that the utility function is linear in the rank term. It amounts to assuming that the
utility gain associated with a marginal increase in the rank is the same whatever
the initial rank of the person2.
Let ¯ denote the psychological discount rate. The optimal consumption path
(ci
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1 ¸ 0 yi
0;G0(:) and G1(:) given
1The hypothesis f(y
¡
0 ) = 0 put in H1 will be necessary in the following to ensure that the
second order condition is indeed a su¢cient condition of the maximization problem stated below.
See Appendix B for more details.
2Robson (1992) provides arguments in favor of the convex case while Corneo and Jeanne
(1997) only consider the concave case. In the latter case the wealth poor has a higher concern
for status than the wealth rich (see also the analysis in Corneo and Jeanne (1997)). Note that
the present model could be extended in either direction without changing its basic results.
4Each individual evaluates its path of consumption by taking as given the evo-














equilibrium of the economy if (ci
0;ci
1) solves for (P) for every possible yi
0 and
if G0(:) and G1(:) correctly describe the evolution of the resulting consumption
distribution.
The associated …rst order condition is: T 0
0(ci
0) ¡ ¯RT 0
1(ci























The consumer bene…ts from a rank increase of g0(ci
0) by marginally increasing
today’s consumption at cost of a loss of tomorrow’s rank of Rg1(ci
1).


















1) < 0: (2.2)
In the following we restrict our attention to equilibria in which the consumption


















H3 can be equivalently stated: u00(ci
t)+®g0
t(ci
t) < 0. The …rst term is negative
by assumption. The second term is relative to the status concern. Wherever
the consumption density function is increasing, the concavity of u(:) must be
su¢ciently strong or the weight ® must be su¢ciently small for H3 to be satis…ed.
Indeed, in that case, a marginal increase in consumption implies catching up a
greater fraction of individuals, which introduces a convex element in the utility
function.
We now analyze how the concern for relative consumption distorts saving
behaviors.
3. The e¤ects of relative consumption on saving
The consumption decisions of the whole consumers impose an externality for each
of them by shaping the consumption distribution and its evolution through time.
5There is however a particular case in which this externality completely disappears





0 8 ® ¸ 0 if R = 1=¯.
Proof. The …rst order condition is: T0
0(ci
0) = T 0
1(ci





0. In this case the consumption distribution is stationary:
G0(ci
0) = G1(ci
1), and so is the instantaneous utility function: T0(ci
0) = T1(ci
1).
Hence the guessed solution does satisfy the …rst order condition. ¤
The result can be interpreted as follows: R = 1=¯ implies that if the con-
sumption distribution is time-invariant, then a marginal gain in rank is exactly
compensated by the corresponding discounted loss of rank in the other period.
Hence each individual is led to consume his permanent income as in the case
without relative consumption ® = 0. Moreover, because they consume their per-
manent income, the consumption distribution is indeed time-invariant.
This particular case makes apparent that the wealth distribution or the con-
sumption distribution as such does not matter here. Rather the relevant question
regarding saving is how this distribution evolves through time as it is now shown.
The …rst order condition (2.1) implicitly provides the consumption optimal
rule. The consumers’ problems are however not independent and interact through
the distributions of consumption described by g0(:) and g1(:).
The optimal rule for date 0 consumption is noted: ci
0 = ©0(yi
0). The optimal




0). As previously noted, we restrict ourselves to equilibria





0) > 0 and is ful…lled in the model:








Lemma 1 implies that ©0(:) and ©1(:) can be inverted. These functions are











1). Let us de…ne ci
1 = Ã(ci
0) the wealth expansion path which says how the
optimal combination of consumptions (ci
0;ci
1) evolves when the wealth is increas-
ing. Lemma 1 implies that Ã(:) is continuously increasing over [c0;c0] where c0
and c0 are respectively the lower bound and the upper bound of the consumption




0) for all i at equilibrium, the probability density functions































The magnitude of the impact of status on saving depends on the wealth density
function f(yi
0). This is intuitive since the gain in term of rank from marginally
increasing consumption is proportional to the number of individuals which con-
sume the same level. The sign of the impact is given by the di¤erence between
the slope of the wealth expansion path Ã
0(ci




tive (a consequence of lemma 1). If this gap is positive, the relative consumption
hypothesis has a negative impact on saving and the converse is true if the gap is
negative.
This result is explained by noting that the slope of the wealth expansion path
determines how the consumption distribution evolves through time. If this slope





0)). They are decreasing if the slope is smaller than one. A
high enough slope is then accompanied by less saving because the distance between
individuals in terms of their consumption is smaller in …rst period (or possibly
not high enough if ¯R < Ã
0(ci
0) < 1) making stronger the contests for status in
this period than in the second period. The incentive to catch up other individuals
is higher, thereby promoting …rst period consumption. Notice that this incentive
is e¤ective even though individuals eventually fail to improve at equilibrium their
rank at both dates compared to their wealth rank. In other words, facing the
distorted consumption distributions they are just able to preserve their wealth
rank.
A preliminary conclusion is that a negative impact of status on saving is ac-
companied by a rise in consumption inequalities if the gross interest rate is smaller
than 1=¯. If R is greater than 1=¯ the rise in consumption inequalities must be
su¢ciently marked for individuals to be deterred from saving. However this con-
clusion is only partial since the wealth expansion path is endogenous here. In the
next section, we completely characterize an equilibrium by posing simple func-
tional forms for the wealth distribution and the utility function.
74. An example
To completely characterize the equilibrium we need to …nd the optimal policy
rule ©0(:) which solves for the …rst order condition together with the budgetary
constraint. To keep the problem tractable, we assume that the wealth density
function takes a linear form: f(yi
0) = ayi








. Since the hypothesis
H1: f(y
¡
0 ) = 0 must hold, it follows that the wealth distribution has a triangular
form with a positive slope a > 0 and f(y
+
0 ) > 0 3. The direct utility function is
assumed to be quadratic 4:





By exploiting the rank preserving property of the model, the …rst order con-






















We solve for the policy rule ©0(yi
0) by the method of undetermined coe¢cients.
We guess that ©0(yi
0) = ´+°yi
0 where ´ and ° are unknown parameters. We have
then ©1(yi
0) = R[¡´+(1¡°)yi



















We obtain a linear function of ci
0 in term of yi
0. As a result the parameters ´ and
° can readily be identi…ed:
Proposition 2. the optimal rule for date 0 consumption takes the following
form: ci
0 = ´ + °yi






2 ¡ ®b(1 + ¯))° + ®b = 0
´ =
1 ¡ ¯R + ®a((1=°) ¡ ¯=(1 ¡ °))
µ(1 + ¯R2)
3The distribution of wealth postulated here does not resemble real distributions. This does
not a¤ect however the conclusions about the e¤ects on aggregate saving, which is the focus of
the paper.
4We shall assume throughout that the marginal utility is always positive. This is the case if
1=µ > ci




0 ] and 8 t = 0;1 which is a su¢cient condition here.
8The slope ° is the solution of a polynomial of degree 3. We are led to a
numerical determination of ´ and °. As an illustration, let the parameters of the
economy be: (µ;¯;a;b;®)=(0:01; 0:1615; 4:5; 0:15; 0:038) and R = 1:1=¯ 5. There
are three real roots for °. However two roots are rejected since they do not satisfy
the assumption H3 which assures the rank preserving property of the model and
the second order condition of the problem. We are left with a single value for °.
It follows that the policy rule as well as the equilibrium are unique. This result is
preserved when we modify the parameters of the economy in a way that preserves
H3.
Figure 1 plots saving as a function of the …rst period consumption. The solid
line represents the wealth expansion path of this economy in the (c0-c1) space.
The density function of the …rst period consumption is plotted over its support
[c0;c0]. The corresponding density function of the second period consumption is
then readily shown on the c1-axis given the wealth expansion path. The dashed
line represents the budget expansionary path without status-seeking (® = 0).
Two observations can be drawn from this …gure. First, the departure of saving
from the case without status is greater the richer the individuals. This is explained
by the fact that the e¤ect of the status on saving is proportional to the density
function as shown by the …rst order condition (4.1) together with the triangular
form of the wealth density function.
Second, aggregate saving is promoted. This feature comes from the particular
value of the saving return in the numerical example: R = 1:1=¯. Indeed, numerical
experiments show that agents save more whenever R > 1=¯ and save less when
R < 1=¯. Figure 2 shows the case in which R = 0:9=¯. The explanation is
directly related to the sign of Ã
0(ci
0) ¡ ¯R as stressed in the previous section.
Let us …rst consider the evolution of the consumption distribution without social















0) is then (¯R)¡1. Hence Ã
0
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0) is smaller than 1 implying that the distribution of the
second period consumption is more concentrated than the distribution of the …rst
5Given the slope a of the wealth density, the weight ® is chosen small enough such that H3 is
veri…ed. Notice that the density function does not sum to one in the example. This is without
consequence since individuals are concerned about their ordinal rank in the distribution.
9period consumption. Now, when agents care about their consumption rank, this
initial asymmetry provides an additional incentive to save and to consume more
in second period. This comes from the fact that a higher consumption in the
second period entails a gain of rank greater than the corresponding loss in the
…rst period. Hence the contest for status is stronger in this period as explained in
the previous section. Moreover, since the incentive is proportional to the wealth
density function and since the latter is upward sloping, the slope of the wealth
expansion path with status-seeking (Ã
0(ci
0)) is greater than the one without status.
However, the equilibrium slope remains inferior to ¯R in order to keep the saving
incentive at equilibrium. The converse case in which R < 1=¯ leads to a symmetric
reasoning. The economy without status displays a more concentrated …rst period
consumption distribution, a property which deters saving when agents care about
their consumption rank.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown how a concern for the rank in the consumption dis-
tribution a¤ects saving. The consumption decisions are interrelated in a complex
manner and turn out to depend on how the distribution of consumption evolves
through time. In a simple version of the model we have shown a negative impact
on saving must be accompanied by a rise in consumption inequalities. The latter
fact seems indeed the case in most developed countries.
The model has other potential implications not investigated in the present
paper. Posing a more realistic wealth distribution would allow to examine which
class of people according to their wealth are the most sensitive to the status e¤ect.
Second, the qualitative impact on saving depends on how the wealth distribution
translates into the dynamics of the consumption distribution. This mechanism
turns out to be primarily determined by the form of the utility function. Therefore
it could be interesting to generalize the model along this dimension. The model
could also be extended by assuming long-lived agents. All these extensions would
require the problem to be numerically solved however.
Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
10Let us demonstrate that the hypothesis H3: T 00
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Since the second order condition ensures that the denominator is negative, the
slope is positive followingH3: T 00
1(ct) < 0. The optimal second period consumption





















which is positive if T 00
0(ct) < 0. ¤
B The …rst order condition is a su¢cient condition under H3.
First, notice that the rank preserving property of the model holds under H3
(see Appendix A).
Let V (ci











The individuals maximize V (ci
0) by choosing ci
0 over [0;yi
0] where Gt(:) are given,
t = 0;1. Let us de…ne c0, c0, c1 and c1 which are respectively the lower bound
and the upper bound of the …rst period consumption distribution and the lower
bound and the upper bound of the second period consumption distribution. Let
b c0 and e c0 be the …rst period consumption implying respectively ci
1 = c1and ci
1 = c1
via the budget constraint: b c0 = yi
0 ¡ c1=R and e c0 = yi
0 ¡ c1=R.
Let us consider some wealth yi
0 and a given consumption distribution at both
dates. There exist several cases: the amount the individual may consume in …rst
period belongs or do not belong to the current consumption distribution; the
second period consumption belongs or do not belong to the current consumption
distribution 6.




0 2 ]c0;c0[ \ ]e c0;b c0[.
In this case the …rst period consumption and the second period consumption

















which is true under H3.
Case 2. ci
0 2 ]c0;c0[ \ [0;e c0[ \ ]b c0;yi
0].
The …rst period consumption is interior to the distribution, contrary to the
second period consumption. This implies g1(ci
1) = 0 in the neighborhood of ci
1.













which holds under H3.
Case 3. ci
0 2 [0;c0[ \ ]c0;yi
0] \ ]e c0;b c0[.
The second period consumption is interior to the distribution, contrary to the
…rst period consumption. This implies g0(ci
1) = 0 in the neighborhood of ci
0. Then













which is veri…ed under H3.
Case 4. ci
0 2 [0;yi
0] ¡ ]c0;c0[ ¡ ]e c0;b c0[.
The consumption is outside the consumption distribution at both periods. As
a result g0(ci
0) = 0 and g1(ci




It remains to verify that V (:) is also concave in the neighborhood of c0, c1,
c0, c1. To do so, we have to take account that G0(:) and G1(:) are not twice
continuously di¤erentiable at these points. Here, it is however su¢cient to show
that the …rst derivative V 0(c0) is decreasing in the neighborhood of these points.
We shall consider four cases: (I) ci
0 = c0, (II) ci
0 = b c0 (or equivalently ci
1 = c1),
(III) ci
0 = c0 and (IV ) ci
0 = e c0 (or ci
1 = c1).
12(I) ci
0 = c0. We restrict our analysis to the individuals yi
0 > y
¡
0 . A similar
reasoning would however apply to individuals endowed with y
¡
0 . Suppose ci
0 =





























since the rank in the distribution of the …rst period consumption is unchanged
in the left-neighborhood of ci
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0(c0) = 0 following f(y
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As a result V 0(c0) is continuous and decreasing in the neighborhood of c0.
(II) ci
0 = b c0 (implying ci




loss of generality. If ci













since the rank in the distribution of the second period consumption is un-
changed in the right-neighborhood of ci
0. The di¤erence between the two expres-
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0) is therefore continuously decreasing in the neighborhood of b c0.
13(III) ci


















since the rank in the distribution of the …rst period consumption is constant
in the right-neighborhood of ci
















which is negative. Consequently V 0(ci
0) is not continuous but remains decreas-
ing in the neighborhood of c0.
(IV ) ci
0 = e c0 (or ci


















since the rank in the distribution of the …rst period consumption is constant
in the left-neighborhood of ci
















which is negative. As a consequence V 0(ci
0) is decreasing in the neighborhood
of e c0. ¤
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Figure 2: Saving in the case beta*R=0.9
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